Non‐Discrimination and the Pareto Principle

Yongsheng Xu (The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, School of Economics, University of Nottingham and Department of Economics, Georgia State University)

要旨Abstract

　This paper proposes and examines the notion of non-discrimination in an Arrow-Sen social choice framework. A minimal requirement for non-discrimination is that there are at least two individuals, each with a pair of social states, such that the society should treat them symmetrically so long as the two individuals are symmetric and have symmetric preferences over their respective pairs. It is then shown that this minimal requirement is in conflict with the weak Pareto principle if all logically possible individual preferences are allowed.

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書誌情報Bibliographic information

Vol. 51, No. 1, 2000 , pp. 54-60
HERMES-IR（一橋大学機関リポジトリ）: https://doi.org/10.15057/21409