Jan. 25, 2011
体制移行・組織分化・ガバナンス―予算制約と取引費用の経済学―
Systemic Transformation, Organizational Diversity, and Governance -Economics of Budget Constraint and Transaction Cost-
要旨Abstract
移行経済の考察から，ガバナンス構造は取引費用を最小化する方向に決定されるという取引費用経済学の想定は，この予想の基礎にある人間の特性は競争的市場経済において典型的なそれと移行経済のそれでは異なり得る，という可能性によって補完されねばならないことが明らかとなる．概念装置としての予算制約は，取引費用の性質，水準及び構成とそれらを通じた組織的ガバナンスの効率解を決定付ける行動変数の一つと見なされる．そしてこのことは，企業統治は，組織内部の利害衝突を回避し，非契約的特殊的投資を実行する人々に対して，信頼に値する保護とインセンティブを与えるものでなければならないという定義を与える．この事実は，異なる国々における組織と企業ガバナンスの異質なシステムの共存に関する理解に道を開き，移行諸国における代替的企業組織と統治形態の比較優位を分析する可能性をもたらす．
When dealing with economies in transformation, it becomes evident that the transaction cost economics prediction that governance is solved in a transaction-costs-minimising way has to be complemented with the possibility that human attributes that are at the basis of this prediction may be different from those typical of a competitive market economies. The concept of the budget constraint considered as a behavioural variable determines the nature, level and composition of transaction costs and through these the effective organisational governance solution. This in turn defines the features that corporate governance should have to avoid conflicts within the organisation and provide credible protection and incentives to the actors that implement non-contractable specific investment. This fact opens the way for the co-existence of different systems of organisational and corporate governance in different countries and opens the possibility to of analysing the comparative efficacy of alternative forms of organisational and corporate governance in countries in transformation.
書誌情報Bibliographic information
Vol. 60, No. 1, 2009 , pp. 16-28
HERMES-IR（一橋大学機関リポジトリ）: https://doi.org/10.15057/21470
JEL Classification Codes: D23, G34, L22, P12
