希望退職と逆選択―企業内人事データによる検証―

都留康 (一橋大学経済研究所)

'Buyout' and Adverse Selection in Employment Adjustment -Evidence from Personnel Data-

Tsuyoshi Tsuru (The Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University)

要旨Abstract

　本稿の目的は，機械関連のメーカーA社が1993年度と96年度に実施した2回の希望退職募集を分析対象とし，希望退職応募者と在職者全体ならびに自己都合退職者とを比較することにより，両者の査定点などにどのような差異があるのかを分析することにある．A社人事データを分析した結果，以下のことが明らかとなった．まず，第一次雇用調整においては，在職者全体と希望退職者との比較，ならびに自己都合退職者と希望退職者との比較から，希望退職者の職能資格等級や給与は相対的に高いにもかかわらず，査定点は在職者と同等程度であり，自己都合退職者よりも低いことが判明した．つまり，この回は，希望退職者は会社にとって辞めてほしい人だったといえる．次に，第２次雇用調整においては，同様の比較から，管理職層では在職者全体と希望退職者との間の査定点はほぼ同等程度であったが，非管理職の資格の低い層では希望退職者の査定点が有意に高く，自己都合退職者と希望退職者との間には査定点の差はないことが明らかとなった．これから，非管理職層で能力の高い者が流出している可能性があるといえる．希望退職には指名解雇とは異なり「誰が辞めるかわからない」面がある．A社の事例は，優遇条件や勧奨活動によっても，会社が辞めてほしい人だけが辞めるのではなく，成績優秀者も流出するという逆選択現象が希望退職には伴うことを明らかにしている．

　Using personnel data from a Japanese machine-producing company, we examine the nature of employment adjustments using buyout formulas. Performance ratings and other characteristics for employees who accepted buyouts in 1993 and 1996 are compared with those of employees who remained or left voluntarily. The empirical results reveal the following points. In the case of 1993 buyout, while the skill grade level and associated level of earnings of buyout takers are relatively high, their performance ratings are the same as those of incumbents and lower than those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the buyout takers were those whom the company wanted to dismiss. For the 1996 buyout, although performance ratings of buyout takers were the same as those of incumbents in the case of managers, the ratings of non-managerial, lower-graded (i.e. lower ranked position) buyout takers were higher than those of incumbents and the same as those of voluntary leavers. Therefore, the non-managerial buyout takers were those whom the company would have preferred to retain. To conclude, the company was able to specify who was dismissed but was unable to specify who took buyouts despite efforts to ensure retention of value employees, including careful setting of incentive schemes. The case presented in this paper demonstrates that employment adjustment using a buyout framework invites "adverse selection" despite careful employer precautions.

Full Text

書誌情報Bibliographic information

Vol. 56, No. 1, 2005 , pp. 42-52
HERMES-IR（一橋大学機関リポジトリ）: https://doi.org/10.15057/21221